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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
METROPOLITAN FINANCE CO.,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 19291

THE STATE OF UTAH, THE STATE
TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, and
JOHN DOES 1 th rough 25,
Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves Chapter 30 of Title 63, the
Governmental Immunity Act.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Judge Timothy R. Hanson ruled that "the issuance of
Motor Vehicle Certificates of Title falls into the category of
governmental functions.•

Be further ruled that the acts of

defendants •are specifically not waived under Section 63-30-10
(3) and (6), Utah Code Ann., 1953."
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants State of Utah and the State Tax Commission
request that the Order of the District Court be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State Tax Commission, through the Motor VehicJ,
Division, issued a clear title on the 1974 Rolls Royce on
November 15, 1974, to Kenneth Melby.

On May 8, 1975, a

duplicate title was issued to Melby.
Stephen J. Gibbs was issued a new title on June 15,
1978, upon surrender of the original title.

This new title

showed Metropolitan Finance as a lien holder.
Metropolitan Finance obtained a Judgment of
Foreclosure and Order of Sale against Stephen J. Gibbs.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ISSUANCE OF TITLE CERTIFICATES IS AN
EXERCISE OF A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION.
Standiford y. Salt Lake City

605 P.2d 1230,

outlines the criteria essential for governmental immunity under
Section 63-30-3 of the Governmental Immunity Act.

That section

provides that "all governmental entities are immune from suit
for any injury which results from the exercise of
goyernmental function . • . •
Standiford defined a governmental function as an
activity "of such a unique nature that it can only be perforroea
by a governmental agency.•

A possible enlargement of that

definition was made in Madsen y. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627.
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The Utah Motor Vehicle Act, Chapter 1 of Title 41,
Utal1

Code Ann·, provides for the Motor Vehicle Division of the

rrtah Tax Commission to administer, regulate and issue motor
vehicle registrations and titles.

In Utah, as in all other

states, this activity is completely administered and operated
by

the state government to facilitate law enforcement and

related activities.

The issuing of motor vehicle titles is "of

such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a
governmental agency."
POINT II

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IS NOT WAIVED UNDER
63-30-10 (c) AND (f).
As the injury "allegedly" suffered by the plaintiff
resulted from the "exercise for governmental function" under
Section 63-30-3 the state is immune unless immunity is
expressly waived in other sections of the Iimnunity Act.
Plaintiff bases his action on the purported negligence of the
State Tax Commission (Motor Vehicle Division).

It is true that

Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10 generally waives governmental immunity
for injuries caused by the negligent acts or omissions of
governmental employees; however, that section specifically
preservee immunity as to certain activities, including those
where the alleged injury:
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial,
suspension or revocation of, or by the failure
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke,
any permit, license, certificate, approval,
order, or similar authorization, or • • • •

-3-

(fl arises out of a misrepresentation by said
employee whether or not such is negligent or
intentional. • •
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that Utah Code AM.
63-30-lO(f} provides complete immunity from suit to a
governmental entity for the negligent misrepresentation of ar,
employee, even where a plaintiff has suffered pecuniary loss
reliance upon the misrepresentation.

in

In Rapp y, Salt Lake

.ciU• 527 P.2d 651 <Utah 1974), the plaintiff sued to recover
the expense he incurred in preparing a bid for a construction
project, where the City's invitation for bids failed to
disclose that a competitive advantage had already been granted
to a third party and that the bidding was not truly
competitive.

The Court found that the plaintiff's action was'

tort action, alleging deceit, and cited Utah Code Ann. 63-30-J,
10(2) and 10(6) in holding that the trial court properly
granted the city's motion for summary judgment.

Also, an

action against the State for the alleged misrepresentation of
an employee as to the status of plaintiff's access after
highway improvement was dismissed in Boyce y. State, 26 Utah
2d 138, 486 P.2d 387

<1971).

Defendant is not aware of other Utah case law which
construes Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10
pocket

(3)

and (6), ((cl and (fl in

However, it is highly instructive to look

to decisions by California courts construing statutes
substantially identical to the Utah sections where pecuniary
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ln•s has been alleged due to the issuance of an incorrect
or to a negligent misrepresentation by a public
Pmployee.

The California statutes were enacted in 1963, two

years before the enactment of the Utah states. 1
In Brown y. City of Los Angeles, 267 Cal.App. 849,
73 Cal.Rptr. 364 Cl968J, plaintiff, the erstwhile operator of a
therapeutic massage parlor and income tax service, sued for
damages incurred in closing her business after being notified
by

the city that her business violated local zoning and being

misinformed by city personnel that no zoning variance had been
granted.

1

The Court found that the erroneous notification

section 818.4 of the California Government Code states:
A public entity is not liable for an injury
caused by the issuance. denial. suspension or
reyocation of, or by the failure or refusal to
issue. deny. suspend or reyoke. any permit.
license certificate. approyal. order. or similar
authorization where the public entity or an
employee of the public entity is authorized by
enactment to determine whether or not such
authorization should be issued, denied,
suspended or revoked.
Section 818.8 of the California Government Code states:
A public entity is not liable for an injury
caused by misrepresentation by an employee
of the public entity, whether or not such
misrepresentation be negligent or intentional.

The language emphasized is contained verbatim in Utah Code Ann.

63-30-10 CcJ and Cf), respectively.

-5-

amounted to a misrepresentation within the meaning of sectic:.
818.8 and on the basis of that section, 818.4, and other
sections of of the Governmental Code, held that such a
misrepresentation could not be the basis for public liabilit\.
And in a case almost exactly on point the innocent
purchaser of a stolen automobile brought an action against th;
California Department of Motor Vehicles because its personnel
had negligently issued a certificate of title to the thief, anc
had failed to require the filing of a bond, Hirsch y. People,
Department of Motor Vehicles, 42 Cal.App.3d 352, 115 Cal.Rptr.
452 (1972).

The court ruled that in light of California's

specific statutory reference to "certificates• of automobile
ownership, such certificates were within the meaning of sect1or,
Bl 8. 4, which imrnun ized the State for the issuance of "any . ,
certificate" (see footnote 1 and Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10 (3)).
The Court held that the erroneous certificate of title
constitutes a "misrepresentation:" under section 818.8, and
"defendant would be entitled to immunity under that section
alone.•

at 455.

The Court affirmed the lower court's

dismissal of the action.
Similarly, in Schonfeld y. City of Valleio, 50
Cal.App.3d 401, 123 Cal.Rptr. 669 <1975), dismissal of an
action against the city because it was immune under the
"misrepresentation• section, 818.B, was affirmed.

There,

the

plaintiff alleged that the city manager's misrepresentations
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wrongfully induced him to do development work on a marina which
he would not have done absent the misrepresentation.
In Grenell y. City of Hermosa Beach, 103 Cal.App.3d
864,

163 Cal.Rptr. 315 (1980), the purchasers of real property

sued the sellers and the city for damages, where city employees
had negligently misstated the content of city records by
representing that local zoning law would allow two dwelling
units on the property.

The sellers also cross-claimed against

the city, on the basis that, at the time of the sellers'
earlier purchase of the property, a similar negligent
misstatement of the records had been made by city personnel.
The trial court dismissed the cross-complaint, and the
appellate court affirmed, on the basis that section 818.8
provided the city with absolute immunity from liability for the
negligent misrepresentation alleged.
New Jersey has similar statutes providing that a
'public entity is not liable for an injury caused by the
issuance .

of

• any permit, license, certificate.

New Jersey statutes Ann. 59:2-5 and that a public entity is not
liable for the "misrepresentation• of its employee, N.J.S.A.
59:2-2(b), 3-10.

In Mallory y, State, 76 N.J. 515, 388 A.2d

622 (1978), suit was brought against the state real estate
licensing body for its erroneous notification to plaintiff that
he bad failed the licensing examination.

The Court found that

the 'licensing• statute cited above granted a "pervasive•
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immunity to "all phases of the licensing function," .!.Ji.. at
625, and, therefore, found it unnecessary to consider the
applicability of the "misrepresentation" section.
Finally, the Federal Tort Claims Act has a section
which preserves governmental immunity for "any claim arising
out of • • • misrepresentation • • • •, 28 u.s.c. 2680(hl.

n,,

section has been described as analogous to section 818.8 of
California Government Code, Johnson y. State, 69 Cal.2d 782,
447 P.2d 352 Cl96 8), and must be deemed as analogous also to
the very similar Utah statute, Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10 (f).

The

Utah Supreme Court has previously looked to the judicial
interpretations of provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act as
an aid in construing similar provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, e.g., Franky. State, 613 P.2d
517, 519 !1980).
In United States y. Neystadt, 366 U.S. 696, 81
s.ct. 1294 C1961), the Supreme Court held as a matter of law
that the purchaser of a home who was induced by a
performed FHA appraisal to pay in excess of fair market value
could not recover damages against the government.

Pursuant to

12 u.s.c. 1715q, a section of the National Housing Act, the
seller had delivered to the buyer an official FHA document,
setting forth a statement of the FHA-appraised value.
Court held that this negligent misrepresentation was
comprehended by 28 u.s.c. 2680Chl, and the action was
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The

dismissed.
'i·

The Court cited with approval, inter alia, .lla.U.

United States, 274 F.2d 69 ClOth Cir. 1959), where the

rourt of Appeals held that plaintiff could not recover where,
relying on a negligent report by Department of Agriculture
agents that his cattle were diseased, he had sold them at less
than fair value.
A factual comparison of the Utah, California, New
Jersey and federal cases cited above with the instant case
clearly demonstrates that this action must be dismissed.

In

each of the cited cases, as in the present action, plaintiffs
alleged that they had suffered a pecuniary loss through
reliance on a negligently issued certificate or license, or on
a misrepresentation of fact by a governmental agency.

Each

action was dismissed as a matter of law, on the basis either of
a statute providing immunity for negligent misrepresentations
(EiU2!1, Schonfeld, Grenell, Neustadt, and ll.all cases),
or a statute providing immunity for the issuance of a
certificate or license (Mallory easel, or both statutes
and

cases).
In both the

and

Neustadt cases,

governmental agencies which were directed by statute to issue
informational statements or certific.ates did so, erroneously
and negligently; in each case, a third party conveyed the
!!\accurate information to the plaintiff, who, in reliance on
1+,

suffered pecuniary damage.
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The instant case is in exactly

the same posture -- it is alleged that the State Tax Commiss.
charged by statute with the issuance of certificates of title
!see Chapter 1 of Title 41, Utah Code Ann.) negligently issue.
a duplicate certificate of title and plaintiff subsequently
suffered a pecuniary loss through reliance upon the erroneou'
certificate.

Both the

and Neustadt cases were

dismissed under statutes substantially the same as Utah Code
Ann. 63-30-10(6).

The defendant, State of Utah, in this actic'.

is clearly granted immunity from suit, and the matter must be
dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Chapter 1 of Title 41, th'
State Tax Commission, Motor Vehicle Division issued a
"certificate" of title.

Plaintiff claims that the certificate

misrepresented the true record, and that plaintiff suffered a
financial loss in reliance on the negligent misrepresentation.
Utah Code Ann. 63-30-lO(c) and (f) expressly preserve
governmental immunity for damages arising from the issuance of
any certificate or from a negligent misrepresentation.

Both

the unambiguous statutory language and the case law construinq
these and nearly identical statutes in other jurisdictions
require that this action be dismissed.
DATED this

-FRANK

-

---------------

.
ELSON
Assistant Attorney General
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